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ARTICLES
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONMAKING
Martha S. Davis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Standards of Review Generally
The idea of using standards to guide appellate review of
decisions of tribunals below has existed from the beginning of
American jurisprudence, but the articulation of those standards
is a fairly recent and still not always clear development.' A
standard of review indicates to the reviewing court the degree of
deference that it is to give to the actions and decisions under
review.2 In other words, it is a statement of the power not only of
* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University;
J.D., Baylor University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; co-author with
Steven Alan Childress of FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (2d ed., Butterworth's 1992).
Much of the discussion herein also appears in the second edition of FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW, particularly in chapters 4, 7, and 11.
1. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW (Wiley
1986) was the first comprehensive work on the subject.
2. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of JudicialReview, 33 S.D. L.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 2000)
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the appellate court but also of the tribunal below, measured by
the hesitation of the appellate court to overturn the lower court's
decision.
"All appellate Gaul," says Professor Maurice Rosenberg,
"is divided into three parts: review of facts, review of law, and
review of discretion." 3 In reviewing fact decisions, the appellate
court displays a high level of deference to the trial court under a
"clearly erroneous" standard' and to the agency decision under
"substantial evidence" review.' Under either standard, an
appellate court will sustain any reasonable or not unreasonable
decision that could be reached by reasoning from the evidence.
In reviewing questions of law, and the more difficult "mixed"
questions (applications of law to the facts of the case), the
appellate court typically applies straightforward de novo
review.6 If the court agrees with the trial court decision, it is
sustained; otherwise, the lower court decision is reversed. Where
an agency decision is concerned, the reviewing court need not
agree even with the statement of law so long as the agency's
interpretation of law is a reasoned one. In fact, agency decisions
receive in general more deference than is accorded to trial court
decisions.7 Discretionary decisions, such as issues of policy,
supervision, and the like, are reviewed under the label "abuse of
discretion."
"Abuse of discretion" is a poorly framed label for the
review done of discretionary decisionmaking, s but it has been
used broadly and for a considerable time, so it will likely

Rev. 468, 469 (1988).
3. Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173

(1978).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573-75 (1985); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
5. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, §§ 15.04-15.06; Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

6. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, §§ 2.13-2.20, 15.02.
7. See id. at Part IV. Also see Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), in which the Court established an area of statutory construction that is
the business of the agency and not of the court. "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill.... a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by an administrative agency." Id at 844.

The Chevron case is more fully discussed infra at notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 13-69 and accompanying text, describing the comments of the three
scholars under examination in the next section.
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continue to be used to describe the review. In review of
discretion, the focus of the reviewing court is supposed to be on
the process used to reach the decision and not on the decision
itself. However, appellate courts have come to apply deferential
abuse of discretion review to a broader area, including to the
merits of the decision. The degree to which abuse of discretion
review has come to be applied with a very broad brush reflects
both a drift of the Supreme Court toward more deferential
review for selected parties, agencies, and courts, and also the
current Court's reputation as the "harmless error Court."
The labels identifying the levels or intensity of appellate
review sound deceptively simple, but not one of them admits of
easy analysis. Indeed, any attempt to deal with standards of
review will raise some very difficult questions, such as whether
an issue is one of law, fact, or mixed, or of policy or judgment,
or determining the exact scope of the issue under review. This
article is not intended to cover all standards, but to consider only
discretionary decisionmaking and the manner in which courts
review such decisions under the label "abuse of discretion"
review. The article begins with an exploration of the work of
three leading scholars defining and analyzing discretion and its
review, it then traces five cases that have significantly molded
the current understanding of the abuse of discretion standard,
and concludes with some general advice to appellate
practitioners and judges.
B. Discretion,Specifically
Discretion is one of the most exercised and least
understood of trial court or agency activities-a very basic
activity that must be understood in all areas of decisionmaking
and administrative, criminal, and civil appeals, and one of the
most difficult to address rationally. The need for discretion
arises because there are areas in which the trial court or agency
must exercise a certain measure of judgment in reaction to its
"on the scene" presence at trial, or because Congress and the
courts have given no guidelines for deciding the issue, or
because the issue is one that is so novel or vague that there is no
way to measure the "correctness" of the trial court's decision.
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Major among such areas are trial supervision, conduct of the
parties, and admission (or rejection) of evidence.
"The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or
whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have
dismissed the action; it is whether the District Court abused its
discretion in so doing." 9 The highly deferential review indicated
in the quotation is not the level of deference always accorded to
decisions labeled "discretionary." Frequently, when an issue of
law is new to a jurisdiction, the reviewing court is more focused
on the developing factors and considerations than on the actual
decision itself. This kind of deferential review may continue for
some time in order to allow appellate or trial courts to develop
the factors that should be considered when exercising the
discretion, as well as the balancing of those factors. Eventually,
for issues as to which rules can be developed, the appellate
body, as part of its law-making function and after having further
redefined the factors, will specify those factors and
considerations that will thereafter be required to make the
decision. The end result is usually more a question of law'0 than
an exercise of discretion." During the time that the decision
remains an actual discretionary exercise of judgment, the
9. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976)
(in context of dismissal for discovery violations). Thus, discretion implies the power to
choose within a range of acceptable options. See generally Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (does not mean one answer is "right" and other "wrong").
10. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 265 (3d Cir. 1983) ("There is no
discretion to rely on improper factors."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d
23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (Judge Friendly writing that "[i]t is not inconsistent with the
discretion standard for an appellate court to decline to honor a purported exercise of
discretion which was infected by an error of law"); cf Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 401-02 (1990), discussed infra at notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
11. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis describes the separation between law and discretion
as a "zone," not a sharp line. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 4.05, at 99 (3d ed. 1972). That does not, of course, argue for lumping together all choices
made below as discretionary decisions. Professor Post has clarified that "[d]iscretion is not
simply the negative reflection of law, and if we persist with such a vision, we truncate our
understanding of important and complicated occasions when law authorizes the exercise of
discretion." Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion andRights, 1984 Sup.
CT. REV. 169, 169-70. The "misleading image" of an absolute dichotomy "focuses [our]
attention on the presence or absence of discretion, rather than on the intricate ways in
which discretion and law interact in the process of decision making." Id at 207. Professor
Post would distinguish between discretion resulting from lessened review and discretion
resulting from no legal standards. Id. at 211.
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decision of one district court on the issue should have no broad
control over the same decision by another district court.
However, once the guiding factors (or rules) are put in place, the
question no longer is an application of personal judgment to
supervisory facts and issues, but a broader legal determination of
what facts and issues should determine generically this category
of overall choice.
This article is concerned, then, with discretion-what it is,
why it exists, how it should be exercised, what constitutes its
abuse, how it evolves, and at what point, if ever, an issue
becomes well enough developed jurisprudentially that it ceases
to be discretionary and becomes in fact a rule of law in itself.
II REVIEW

OF SELECTED ARTICLES12

Many scholars have written on discretion and its exercise.
The writings examined here are those of Professors Maurice
Rosenberg and Robert C. Post and of Judge Henry J. Friendly.
The works of these three scholars were selected because each of
them approaches the analysis of discretion and its review in a
slightly different way; together they provide a reasonably
comprehensive understanding.
A. ProfessorRosenberg
According to Professor Rosenberg, the basic notion
underlying the idea of discretion is choice' 3 -that is, no decision
12. This section's discussion incorporates some of the ideas of Professor Maurice
Rosenberg, Judge Henry J. Friendly, and Professor Robert C. Post, as set forth in the
following articles: Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79
F.R.D. 173 (1978) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Appellate Review]; Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.REV. 635
(1971) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion]; Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982); Post, supra note 11. All quotations from these
works have been reproduced with permission of the appropriate review. See also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977);
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990);
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review

in Federal Civil Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustrationand Analysis, 29 LOY. L. REV. 851,
890-903 (1983); George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1984).
13. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion,supra note 12, at 636.
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can be discretionary in the absence of more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of outcome, whether between two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number, left to the
decisionmaker. Professor Rosenberg divides discretion into two
basic types: primary, by which is meant "decision-liberating" or
"true" discretion, and secondary, or "review limiting" or
"guided" discretion. 14 The reviewing courts sometimes lump
together these two kinds of discretion, thus creating confusion
about the meaning of discretion." While there are many and
varied ways to divide discretionary exercises, Professor
Rosenberg's
primary/secondary
division
(or
true
discretion/guided discretion) is a simple one to use.
Primary or true discretion can be exercised not only by trial
courts, but also by reviewing courts and by agencies. Professor
Rosenberg posits that, under primary discretion, the
decisionmaker is free to render whatever decision it chooses
because there are no overriding principles or guidelines within
which it must operate. "In such an area, the court can do no
wrong, legally speaking, for there is no officially right or wrong
answer."' On the other hand, the decisionmaking process is
reviewable for errors of law, even where the decision itself is not
reviewable. 7
Secondary or guided discretion is concerned not so much
with the process of decision as it is with the degree of deference
that will be accorded to the choice made. It "comes into full
play when the rules of review accord the lower court's decision
an unusual amount of insulation from appellate revision." I8 This
kind of discretion essentially is confined to trial court and
agency decisions. Professor Rosenberg illustrates this concept

14. Id. at 638.
15. See id. at 636.
16. Id. at 637.
17. For example, prior to the introduction of the Sentencing Guidelines, any choice by
the trial court as to sentence, so long as it was within the statutory limits, was a protected
discretionary decision. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 11.34. However, if the
jury failed to find the defendant guilty, the trial court could not impose any sentence no

matter how strongly it felt the defendant was in fact guilty. Thus, with true discretion, as in
the discretion to sentence, the appellate court could review as to process and determine the
decision was legal error without ever reviewing the decision itself.
18. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion,supra note 12, at 637.
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by reference to football games. 9 In football, he points out,
although there are many, varied, and very strict rules laid down
for the conduct of the game (the antithesis of primary or true
discretion, where discretion at times arises solely because there
are no rules2"), once a call has been made by the officials, there
is no way to correct it, even though it may be patently wrong
and obviously costly to the wronged team. Although video
shows the call was wrong and everyone who analyzes it says it
was wrong, there simply is no mechanism for redress. The
reason for no review is obvious-in games, finality is essential.
Even if the final score has been skewed by the erroneous call, it
final; it stands, and everyone moves on to the next
is nonetheless
21
game.
In a way, this is also true of judicial and agency discretion.
If the allocation of discretion has been made to the trial court or
agency in such a way that its decision is either unchallengeable
or challengeable only in a restricted way, the trial court can be
wrong without being reversed. Further, some discretionary
decisions are insulated not by allocation to a certain
decisionmaker but because the decision itself has so little
positive or negative impact on anyone that it is not worth the
effort to challenge. Insulation of the discretionary decision to
19. Id. at 639-41.

20. Cf. HART, supra note 12, at 40 (discussing an "umpire's choice" game of no rules
and how that differs from review at law).

21. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion, supra note 12, at 639-41. Obviously, NFL replay
officiating has changed the point at which a decision is final, but Professor Rosenberg's
point still holds.

22. For example, note the problem of unreviewability of mid-trial evidentiary rulings
against the prosecutor's position outlined in Scott J. Shapiro, Note, Reviewing the
Unreviewable Judge: Federal Prosecution Appeals of Mid-Trial Evidentiary Rulings, 99
YALE L.J. 905 (1990).
This kind of discretion varies qualitatively from the discretion related to separation-

of-powers authority accorded agencies in determinations of policy. In judicial review of
discretion exercised below, review is limited because this decision has been allocated to the

court below and is not available for review by the appellate court; in review of agency
discretion, review often is limited because the system of government stays the hand of the
judiciary as to the area of decisionmaking at issue. See EDLEY, supra note 12, at 102-05.

23. For example, almost all courts have a dress code for lawyers and parties. If one
judge chooses to strictly enforce the dress code and another chooses not to enforce it at all,
it is unlikely that either exercise of discretion will be challenged because a challenge would

be costly and would be of little benefit even to the person who brought it. Thus, although
there are rules, the issue is of such limited importance jurisprudentially that it is almost
totally insulated from review.
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this degree is unusual in law. Where such protection is given, it
is most often given to agency decisionmaking by a statute that
forbids the courts to review the decision.24
According to Professor Rosenberg, the first task for review
must be recognizing a discretionary decision. Helpfully, many
statutes and procedural rules set out the standard of review for
various decisions as "abuse of discretion," 5 and we assume that
the label for review is meant to indicate discretionary decisions
below. Continued discretionary decisionmaking as to any
particular issue depends primarily on the willingness of
Congress and higher courts to continue to allow the exercise of
such discretion. That is, some issues are initially the subject of
discretionary decisionmaking because they are novel, or vague,
or without guiding law. When either Congress through statutes
or higher courts through rulings determine to remove trial court
discretion, they are free to do so.26
When reviewing discretionary decisions for abuse, the
reviewing court seeks to determine whether and when the
bounds of discretion seem to have been overreached. While it
would be difficult to determine an abuse of true discretion
because there is no standard by which to measure it even for
reasonableness, 27 abuse of guided discretion occurs either when
the decisionmaker has considered incorrect factors (or has failed
to consider necessary factors) in applying his discretion, or when
24. For example, until 1988, courts had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Veterans' Administration concerning benefits awarded to veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a)
(repealed by Act of Aug. 6, 1991, Pub L. No. 102-83, § 21a, 105 Stat. 378). While this was

modified in 1988 with the Judicial Review of Veterans Claims Act, 38 U.S.C. § 101, the
acts of the agency as to benefits still do not receive the level of review given to other acts
of discretion. Congress, prior to the 1988 Act, had followed the usual procedure-setting
up an Article I court within the agency to hear appeals of agency decisions, and limiting
review to that court. See generally Jonathan Goldstein, New Veterans Legislation Opens
the Door to Judicial Review ... Slowly!, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 889, 921-22 (1989).
25. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(4)(D) (immigration rulings) (1997); 12 U.S.C. §
203(b)(1) (appointment of conservator) (1994); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) (discretion of court

to receive verdict from eleven person jury after one juror has been dismissed).
26. For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines removed an area of formerly
very broad discretion from the district judge, that of within-the-statute sentencing.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 355159); see Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (discussed infra notes 120-26).
27. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion,supra note 12, at 637. However, an admission of

bias by the trial judge or other decisionmaker-such as stated bias based on ethnicity
contrary to law-would permit a finding of abuse of discretion.
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his exercise of discretion (the choice he makes within his
authority) is contrary to the evidence or experience, or is so
arbitrary, on its own terms, that the appellate court feels
compelled to reject the actual choice. 8 Reversal may be ordered
because the process of the decisionmaking (rather than the
decision itself) is unacceptable. The appellate court may also
reverse for some combination of these errors, but still is
generally deferential to the overall process and decision and will
refuse to reverse exercises of discretion hastily or lightly. 9
Areas in which the trial court may exercise discretion are
viewed by Professor Rosenberg as pastures in which the trial
judge can roam and graze freely, rendering rulings his appellate
colleagues might not have made, unless and until the higher
court or Congress fences off a corner of the pasture by
announcing that a rule of law covers the situation and has been
violated. ° Until that occurs, the trial judge, wielding
discretionary power, need not be "right" by appellate court
lights in order to be upheld. Even if the appellate judges disagree
with his call, they will defer to his discretion so long as it was
properly, lawfully exercised.3
Professor Rosenberg describes five reasons for conferring
discretion on the trial court. The "lesser reasons" he lists as: (1)
judicial economy; (2) trial court morale; and (3) finality of
decision, and describes their common vice as a "failure to
provide clear clues as to which trial court rulings are cloaked
with discretionary immunity of some strength." 32 The "good
reasons," which escape that criticism, are (1) that the issue
defies formulation of general rules of decision, whether from
persistent and long-term nonamenability or from novelty; and
(2) the superiority of the trial court's position in being on the
spot. This second justification for conferring discretion is of
particular importance when a decision is "based on facts or

28. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (discussing agency exercise of discretion).
29. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion,supra note 12, at 645-56.

30. Id. at 650.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 662.
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circumstances that are critical to decision and that the record
imperfectly conveys." 3 3
The second of these "good reasons" for conferring
discretion changes very little from court to court or from time to
time. But the first reason-issues that defy formulation-causes
this concept of discretion to be in a constant state of flux. Some
issues originally thought by the appellate courts to be incapable
of governance by general rules of decision are, after a time and a
number of decisions on cases with similar facts, found to be
addressable by such rules. When, over time, a pattern of
decision with regard to similar facts emerges, it becomes in
effect a rule of law, and that "corner of the pasture" is removed
from the discretionary field.3 4 When a decision is no longer
discretionary, the lower court commits legal error when it fails
to follow the rule of law, even though the decisionmaking may
continue to be labeled as discretionary. The same is true when
some novel issue arises. The appellate courts may leave the
decision to lower court discretion at least long enough to permit
"experience to accumulate at the lowest court level" until the
appellate courts see a pattern allowing a prescribed rule.35
Various issues will be, at any given time, at different stages in
this evolutionary process.
Thus, Professor Rosenberg's major contribution to a
definition of discretion is the recognition that there are many,
varied kinds and degrees of discretionary exercises that are not
amenable to the same treatment by the reviewing court. His
main distinctions are between primary (true) and secondary
(guided) discretion, and between issues that have no law, or very
little law, to guide the decision and those that are simply novel
or vague and that are likely over time to develop more
specificity and come to be controlled by rules.
B. Judge Friendly
Judge Friendly focused his analysis on methods for
determining the degree and kind of discretion the trial court has
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id. at 650; cf. OLIVER.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 121-29 (1881) (describing

how negligence issue became more concrete and more factual over time).
35. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion,supra note 12, at 662-63.
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as to a particular issue and therefore whether appellate review
should be "full" or "deferential." 3 6 Under Judge Friendly's
assessment, perhaps the first thing that should be considered is
why the trial court has this particular power of discretion.37
Because discretionary power "varies in force from the virtually
irresistible to the virtually meaningless," 38 an inquiry into the
cause for the allocation of discretion as to a particular issue can
help to determine whether the exercise of discretion is of the
controlling or the suggestive variety.
Judge Friendly posits that part of the problem of
understanding this review arises from the common use of the
label "abuse of discretion":
There are a half dozen different definitions of "abuse of
discretion," ranging from ones that would require the
appellate court to come close to finding that the trial court
had taken leave of its senses to others which differ from the
definition of error by only the slightest nuance, with
numerous variations between the extremes.39
Each of these different definitions may be no more than the
child of a judicial parent with the notion that discretion is a
descriptive rather than a generic term, or they may indicate a
series of discretionary issues at different levels of the
evolutionary process described by Professor Rosenberg. 4 In any
event, Judge Friendly, like Professor Rosenberg, 41 believed that
the word "abuse" leads to some untoward conclusions about the
decisionmaker, 42 but finally decided that, whatever term is used
must be a flexible one to accommodate the multifarious reasons
for submitting various issues to discretionary decisionmaking.43

36. Friendly, supra note 12, at 762.
37. Id. at 764 (citing Judge Sloviter in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d
Cir. 1981)).
38. Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion,supra note 12, at 660.
39. Friendly, supra note 12, at 763.
40. Id. at 771.
41. Professor Rosenberg says that "abuse of discretion" is "used to convey the
appellate court's disagreement with what the trial court has done, but does nothing by way
of offering reasons or guidance for the future .... It is a form of ill-tempered appellate
grunting and should be dispensed with." Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion, supra note 12, at
659.
42. Friendly, supra note 12, at 763.
43. Id. at 764.
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And because the reasons for allowing discretionary
decisionmaking are so various, the intensity with which such
decisions are reviewed must also be very flexible. Where there
is literally "no law to apply," 44 there should in fact be
"complete appellate abdication., 45 Otherwise, "[e]ven when a
statute or rule expressly confers discretion ... there is still. the
implicit command that the judge shall exercise his power
reasonably. '4 6 It is this "implicit command" that leads to an
evolution of discretionary issues into rule-controlled issues:
The rulemakers gave the district courts discretion; but after
enough of them had decided always to exercise it the same
way, a way that the court of appeals deemed appropriate,
the channel of discretion had narrowed, and a court of
appeals should keep a judge from steering outside it rather
than allow disparate results on the same facts.47
Judge Friendly ends his article with a quotation from Chief
Justice Marshall, that "discretionary choices are not left to a
court's 'inclination, but to its judgment;
and its judgment is to
48
be guided by sound legal principles."'
C. ProfessorPost
Professor Post rejects the idea of choice as the central
theme of discretion, stating that the concept is "a misleading
image" because it "invites us to conceptualize choice as a
single, unitary act.", 49 Because our jurisprudence is replete with
instances of discretionary decisions that must be guided by legal
norms, some concept other than free choice is required. °
Professor Post asserts the viewpoint theory of discretion: An
appellate court may view a trial court's sentencing decision as a
44. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
45. Friendly, supra note 12, at 765.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 772.

48. Id. at 784 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807)).
49. Post, supra note 11, at 207.

50. While Professor Post's point is logical, it seems to beg the question. As a practical
matter, it is unlikely that exercise of true discretion in the sense of no guidelines occurs in
any substantive area of tribunal decisionmaking; all such decisions must be made within
boundaries. Thus the "choice" language of Professor Rosenberg and the "un" -choice
language of Professor Post seem to amount to the same thing.
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discretionary one, for example, reviewable for abuse.5' As long
as the sentencing decision does not violate the statutory
authority granted the court making the decision, the judge is
afforded broad discretion in arriving at a sentencing
determination. The trial judge may, however, view the same
sentencing decision as one of very limited discretion that must
be made within well-defined parameters of law and policy.
Thus, a trial court's sentencing decision is discretionary,
but it is also governed by legal standards that closely inform or
guide discretion, just as other discretionary decisions are not
committed to the trial court's unlimited or unfettered exercise of
discretion. Although the judge may have room for some choices
within the framework of the legal standards, he feels "bound to
choose the appropriate legal policies" 52 and to implement them
in accordance with the factors that must guide his decision.
From the trial judge's point of view, his discretion is guided by
the need to implement the appropriate legal policies; he may
therefore consider himself "an instrument of law." 53
Abuse is found when the trial court has gone outside the
framework of legal standards or statutory limitations, or when it
fails to properly consider the factors on that issue given by the
higher courts to guide the discretionary determination. However,
when the trial judge makes a decision within the legal standards
and takes .the proper factors into account in the proper way, his
decision is protected even if not wise. The appellate court is not
reviewing the decision but, instead, the manner of making it.54 In
this kind of review, abuse of discretion is only a standard of
review and deals not at all with the merits of the decision.

51. Id. at 209.
52. Id. at 207.

53. Post, supra note 11, at 207; see also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 326, 381 (1924) ("Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will
nothing.").
54. Cf. Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 1983) ("'clearly
erroneous' review is properly focused upon fact-finding processes rather than fact-finding
results"). This assessment tracks appellate review of agency decisions under the
Administrative Procedure Act § 706 standard of abuse of discretion review. See CHILDRESS
& DAVIS, supra note *, ch. 15; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Steven
Alan Childress, ConstitutionalFact and Process: A First Amendment Model of Censorial
Discretion,70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1996).
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There are other decisions in which the trial judge may act
"as he pleases" 55 because there is "no law to guide the judge's
decision." 56 In these cases, there is discretion both from the
viewpoint of the trial judge and of the appellate court. This kind
of discretion is "true" discretion, what Professor Rosenberg
calls primary or decision-liberatingdiscretion," and what Judge
Friendly describes as a situation calling for "complete appellate
abdication." 58 Such situations are very rare. 59
Professor Post's viewpoint discretion varies along a
spectrum ranging from decisions subject to standards that give
no guidance (a form of "no law to apply"; though there is law, it
is so formless that it actually leaves complete discretion in the
trial court), to those with standards so rigid that the
decisionmaker can hardly be said to exercise judgement at all.
As with other spectral standards, most decisions fall in the
middle.60
The deference accorded by the appellate court to such
decisions varies among independent
review, deference, and
S• 61
delegation, depending on the decision. Independent review is
applied to those decisions that, although they may be
denominated discretionary, are actually either contained by
standards so rigid as to allow little or no exercise of judgment or
so "open-textured" as to license the appellate court to secondguess the trial court's decision. 62 Deferential review occurs when
"appellate courts retain control over the governing legal

55. Post, supra note 11, at 210 (citing Kaufman, Judicial Discretion, 17 AM. L. REV.
567, 567 (1883)).

56. Id. at 210-11. For example, the trial judge may control the court calendar. See
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.08. Although there are many procedural examples

of such true discretion situations, there are probably no such examples in a trial court's
substantive decisionmaking.
57. See Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion,supra note 12, at 638.
58. Friendly, supra note 12, at 765.
59. Id.; Post, supra note 11, at 211; Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 12, at 184
("It runs strongly against the grain of our traditions to grant uncontrollable and

unreviewable power to a single judge.").
60. Post, supra note 11, at 212; see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.21.
61. Post, supra note 11, at 213-14.

62. Id. at 214. "Independent review" of discretionary decisions is appropriate in First
Amendment cases in which full appellate review of the record is essential to ensure that a

trial court's exercise of its discretion does not result in a violation of protected rights. Bose
Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485,499 (1984).
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standard, but defer to trial court judgments in the
implementation of that standard." 63 The term delegation is used
in situations where the trial judge's decision is essentially
unreviewed because the appellate courts have delegated "to trial
courts the power to determine the legal standards by which the
correctness of their decisions will be judged." 64
Overriding all these standards of review is the recognition
that when the applicable legal standards are open-textured-a
term borrowed from Professor Hart meaning abstract or capable
of widely varying interpretations,65 or what Professor Dworkin
calls "furry edge[d]" 66-the appellate court may opt for any one
of the three levels of review. Professor Post notes that an
appellate court may opt for delegation long enough to allow the
work of trial courts to give concrete significance to the standard.
Then, when the appellate courts have made the governing legal
standards more forceful or specific, these standards will in turn
more directly guide and influence trial court judgment. This
view is closely akin to Professor Rosenberg's theory of
evolutionary development of legal standards, which gradually
fences in the discretionary pasture;67 and to Judge Friendly's
"implicit command that the judge shall exercise his power
reasonably."68
Thus three scholars, while using varied approaches, come
to much the same conclusions about discretion and how it
should be reviewed. The next question, then, is whether cases
reflect these shared conclusions.

63. Id. at 215. This standard applies when appellate courts "believe that the question
before the trial court is susceptible of different satisfactory resolutions." Rosenberg,

Appellate Review, supra note 12, at 176-77 (discussing circumstances in which trial court
may be affirmed even when it made "wrong" choices).
64. Id.
65. HART, supra note 12, at 124-26.

66. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 22.
67. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
68. Friendly, supra note 12, at 765.
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III. INTERPRETIVE CASE LAW

A. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
The tendency of the Court toward a more inclusive, highly
deferential standard has been apparent for some time. The case
that got everyone's attention was Chevron U.S.A. v. National
Resources Defense Council.6 9 Though an administrative law case
dealing with statutory interpretation, not previously considered
discretionary decisionmaking, it did portend the Court's move
toward allowing each decisionmaker to interpret statutes for
itself and it formed the groundwork for later civil and criminal
cases.
Under Chevron, if the statute unambiguously speaks to the
question at issue, and Congress' intent is clear, no issue arises.
But if Congress has not directly dealt with the precise question
at issue, or if there is a gap in the statute arguably intended by
Congress to be filled by the agency, whether explicit or implicit,
then the Court may not impose its own construction of the
statute on the agency, so long as the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. ° The agency interpretation is to be given
"controlling weight" unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." 7
This view had been building for some time in
administrative law. Under usual circumstances,
[i]f the court defined an issue as purely one of law, then de
novo or independent review was appropriate; if the court
defined an issue as purely one of fact, then deference under
either a substantial evidence or an arbitrary and capricious
standard should be applied. If the issue was a mixed
question, and many questions of agency interpretation are
in fact mixed questions, then the issue must receive either
deferential review as a policy statement or nondeferential
review as strictly an interpretive application of law to fact."

69.
70.
71.
72.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43; see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 17.02 at 17-13.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 15.02.
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 17.02 at 17-11.
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However, even if the issue were characterized as purely one
of law, the Court might see fit to give it deferential review for
any one of a number of reasons, including the fact that the
agency had followed the interpretation over a long period of
time. Scholars might argue how strong a line of cases the
deference-to-law cases were,73 but Chevron put "paid" to any
doubt that the Court felt free to refuse to substitute judgment in
questions of law.
The fine-tuning of the Chevron doctrine has been
responsive to whatever cases came before the Court. Thus, in
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,74 the Court in effect held that it

would defer not only to an agency's interpretation of its own
statute, as in Chevron, but also to one agency's interpretation of
another agency's regulations. The same issue arose in Norfolk &
Western Railway v. American Train Dispatchers Association,75
where the Court reviewed with deference the interpretation of
the Railway Labor Act by the ICC. In Rust v. Sullivan,76 the

Court extended Chevron deference to new regulations of the
agency that represented a very sharp break with past
interpretation of an unchanged statute.
The peculiarity of the development of Chevron, however, is
not in the expansiveness of application, but in those situations in
which the Court refused to apply the doctrine even though
factually there was very little difference between Chevroncontrolled cases and non-Chevron-controlled cases. For
example, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 7 the
issue was whether Title VII applies overseas. Suit was by the
agency to assert protection against employment discrimination
for American employees working in the Persian Gulf area for
American companies. In 1988, the EEOC amended its policy
guidelines to include its opinion that the protection of the Act
extended to such employees. The Supreme Court reversed,
citing several reasons for refusing to extend deference to the
statutory interpretation, but concluding that "while we do not
73. See DAVIS, supra note 11, § 29:16 at 403.
74. 501 U.S. 680, 696-99 (1991).

75. 499 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1991) (recognizing deference to agency, but affirming the
decision "because the commission's interpretation is the correct one").
76. 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991).
77. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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wholly discount the weight to be given to the 1988 guideline, its
persuasive value is limited when judged by the standards set
forth in [citing cases]." 78 All the cases cited were pre-Chevron
and the majority did not mention Chevron in its opinion.7 9
Although, as stated, all of these cases are administrative
law cases, the idea of deferential review of statutory
interpretation stood judicial review on its head. Would this
notion, allowing each decisionmaking body to choose its own
interpretation of a statute, totally change the face of appellate
review?
B. Pierce v. Underwood
A little over four years after Chevron, the Court decided to
extend its reasoning to interpretations of law in civil matters. In
1988, in Pierce v. Underwood, ° the Court set out a general
analysis to help courts decide when particular procedural or
evidentiary decisions would receive abuse deference.' At issue
in the case was whether the government's position in a civil
rights case was substantially justified. Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, a losing governmental agency may prevent
attorney fee-shifting by showing that its position at trial was
substantially justified. For some few specific trial court
determinations, the applicable standard of appellate review is set
or implied by a statute or rule; "[f]or most others, the answer is
provided by a long history of appellate practice." 82 There is little
doubt, then, that precedential characterizations of specific
review standards should weigh heavily in a given application. 3
Some decisions, however, are not so easily classified, and the
Underwood Court conceded that for a determination without "a
78. Id. at 258.
79. See also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992); Funk,
Supreme CourtNews, 21 ADMIN. & REG. NEWS 6 (1996).
80. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).

81. See id. at 557-63. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, applied the analysis
to determine that the issue-whether the government's position was "not substantially
justified" (so that fee-shifting would be appropriate)-is discretionary to the trial court.
See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.15.
82. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 558.

83. For a discussion of such historical characterizations, see CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note *,chs. 4 and 11.
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clear statutory prescription" or "a historical tradition," it is
"uncommonly difficult to derive from the pattern of appellate
review of other questions an analytical framework that will yield

the correct answer." 84
Rather than a statutory directive or a solid framework of
precedent, the trial court is occasionally faced with a kind of
"free-floating" issue with no statutory or precedential standard
to apply, and the Court, acknowledging that its resolution is not
"rigorously scientific," looked for the following "significant
relevant factors" to weigh in favor of or against deferential
review:85 (1) implicit statutory direction, even when language
does not compel deference or is not perfectly clear;f6 (2)
provision for deferential review in analogous determinations
under the statute; (3) the judicial actor who, as a "matter of the
sound administration of justice," is "better positioned than
another to decide the issue" ;" (4) whether it is impracticable to
formulate a rule of decision for the issue, because the problem is
multifarious, novel, fleeting, and resists generalization for now;89
and (5) the substantial consequences and liability of an
erroneous determination.9
84. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 558 (footnote and citation omitted).
85. Id. at 559, 563.
86. Id. at 559 (language hints at deference by saying "unless the court finds").
87. See id. at 559. Justice White in dissent used this factor to argue for de novo review
because Congress was silent as to deference in the relevant portion while explicitly
directing an abuse standard elsewhere in the statute: "Congress knew how to specify an
'abuse of discretion' standard when it chose to do so." Id. at 584 n.1 (White, J., dissenting
in part). At the least such "missing" direction seems to cut both ways.
88. Id. at 559-60. The Court was quoting from Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985), and explicitly borrowing its policy approach used to determine whether mixed lawfact questions would receive deference on appeal, as discussed in CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note *, §§ 2.18 and 7.05. Note, however, that other cases say that lack of superior
position does not necessarily mean that it is inappropriate to defer onfactindings. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
89. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting extensively from Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion, supra note 12, at 662-63). The factor was found to justify deference, at least
until courts had the chance to develop principles for applying the abuse test. See also
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 7.06, discussing how discretion can evolve into a
legal standard.
90. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 563; see generally Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law:
Appellate Review of Determinations That Rule 11 Has Been Violated or That Nonmutual
Issue PreclusionWill Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REV. 733, 734-35, 748-50, 75657 (1990) (arguing for free review of sanctions and collateral estoppel in part based on the
consequences of such findings).
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Under the facts of Underwood, the Court found that the
framework of the statute weighed in favor of deferential review,
finding in the words "unless the Court finds" that the
government's trial position is substantially justified, an implied
directive that the court's substantial justification decision is to
be reviewed deferentially. 9' The Court also found that the
statutory structure of the provision for deferential review under
analogous provisions of the statute cut in favor of deference. 92 In
addition, the Court found the trial court better positioned to
decide the issues because the decision may turn on evidentiary
matters, settlement conferences, or other matters of which the
trial court had first-hand knowledge but as to which the
appellate court would be required to spend an inordinate amount
of time and energy to place itself in a comparable position.93 The
last factor-the substantial amount of liability produced by the
district judge's decision-militates against deferential review
94 in
many cases, but not in connection with an EAJA fee award.
A factor that the Court may have implicitly applied within
the above considerations, but which might be better considered
more explicitly, is a sense in which the matter appears to be
discretionary, i.e., does it smack of judgment, choice, sensitivity,
and presence, or is it instead somewhat informed by broader
concepts that seem legal? 95 Though the Court decided to use a
general policy analysis, some weight likely should be given to
how the issue appears under common understandings of law and
discretion. Is any part of the decision an exercise of true
discretion? If the Court avoided a head-on inquiry because the
analysis could cut either way so readily, then perhaps the matter
needs consideration. 96 Whatever its motive, the Court often does

91. Underwood,487 U.S. at 559.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 559-60.
94. Id. at 563 (noting that the average amount of EAJA fee awards is under $3,000).
95. See, e.g., CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, §§ 4.02 (distinguishing evidence
review by rulings having unusual choice or apparent discretion) & 7.06 (discussing
apparent discretion and concomitant appellate review).
96. See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 583-85 (White, J., dissenting in part). On its face,
whether a party's position is grounded in substantial legal justification may seem naturally
like an issue of law. See also Christopher A. Considine, Note, Rule 11: Conflicting
Appellate Standards of Review and a Proposed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
727, 745-46 (1990).
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include the nature of the issue as a factor in the classification
decision even in policy opinions. 9'
Another policy factor that cuts in favor of de novo review
is appellate consistency, uniformity, and the possibility of shortterm guidance to the lower courts. 9s That factor was likewise not
considered by the Court in Underwood. Finally, the specific
issue had a good deal of precedent that should count as it does in
other inquiries, and in this context, nearly all circuits had found
the matter reviewable de novo. 99
In any event, Underwood does, by developing the factor
and balancing approach, give courts a reasonably easy process to
use in reviewing discretionary decisionmaking for unsettled
issues.
C. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
In 1990, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,'°° the
Supreme Court dealt with review of the district court's
assessment of rule 11 sanctions. The Court pointed out that the
decision involves three types of issues:
The court must consider factual questions regarding the
nature of the attorney's prefiling inquiry and the factual
basis of the pleading or other paper. Legal issues are raised
in considering whether a pleading is "warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument" for changing the law and
whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11. Finally,
the district court must exercise its discretion to tailor an
"appropriate sanction."
Several circuit courts previously had used a similar
separating analysis, dividing the issues into factfindings,
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, legal questions,
reviewed de novo, and the actual sanction decision, reviewed for
abuse of discretion.02 Various circuits combined these reviews
97. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, §§ 2.18 and 7.05, discussing the use of this
literal factor by the Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
98. See, e.g., Underwood, 487 U.S. at 584-85 (White, J., dissenting in part).
99. See id. at 586 (White, J., dissenting in part) (citing cases).
100. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
101. Id. at 399.
102. Id.
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in different ways, but the Cooter & Gell Court determined to use
a "unitary abuse of discretion" standard 3-that is, an abuse of
discretion standard that applied not only to the review of the
sanction decision itself but also to review of the underlying facts
and to decisions of law.
Prior to Cooter & Gell, most circuit courts had agreed that
certain aspects of a sanctions decision would receive deference
under an abuse test or, in part, as factfindings subject to
deference if not clearly erroneous. '1° To this extent, the Court
said, the circuits were in virtual agreement. 5 It is not clear,
however, that under Cooter & Gell's unitary abuse of discretion
standard, questions of fact, law, and discretion get the same or a
similar level of deference. Certainly as to factfindings, the Court
seems at bottom to be expressing an unwillingness to label
review at all, stating that
[w]hen an appellate court reviews a district court's factual
findings, the abuse-of-discretion and clearly erroneous
standards are indistinguishable: A court of appeals would
be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its
discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding
were clearly erroneous.106
Further, the Court noted the difficulty, particularly in the
rule 11 context, of distinguishing between legal and factual
issues. 07
Similarly, pure legal errors, such as misunderstanding of
the scope of rule 11 or reliance on an incorrect view of the law,
in this context could be reviewed (apparently without deference)
within the abuse of discretion inquiry: "An appellate court
would be justified in concluding that, in making such errors, the
district court abused its discretion."' 0'8 In Koon v. United
103. Id. at 403 (relying on Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)).
104. See id. at 399-400 (citing cases). See also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *,

§ 2.03, regarding the applicability of rule 52 to findings underlying motions.
105. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400.
106. Id. at401.
107. Id. (citing Pullman-Standardv. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) for the following
statement: "Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing
law from fact. Nor do we yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly
distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion").
108. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.01 at 4-10 (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496
U.S. at 402). In this case, then, the Court used abuse of discretion as the applicable test
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States,09 the Supreme Court, citing Cooter & Gell, emphasized
that review of legal matters within the general abuse of
discretion inquiry empowers the appellate court to do its
lawmaking function, yet reaffirms that the term de novo need
not be used since the discretion concept subsumes such review:
Little turns, however, on whether we label review of this
particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an
abuse of discretion standard does not mean that a mistake
of law is beyond appellate correction. A district court by
definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law. That a [sentencing guideline] departure decision, in an
occasional case, may call for a legal determination does not
mean, as a consequence, that parts of the review must be
labeled de novo while other parts are labeled an abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion standard includes review
to determine that the discretion was not guided by
erroneous legal conclusions. " °
This review has been a goal of some members of the
Supreme Court for years.
Apparently this review of issues of law is supposed to be
done without deference so that it might as well be called de
novo, and it seems peculiar to wish to label the whole thing
abuse of discretion simply so that the Court need not
differentiate between facts and law. That residual appellate
power was implicit in Pierce v. Underwood and later cases but
was not so openly stated, as those courts were stressing a
preference for general deference. In effect, then, the Court may
be minimizing the extent to which legal error is a factor in the
applicability of abuse review, and maximizing the extent to
which abuse deference follows from the judge's position to
assess facts.
On the one hand, applying de novo review to legal
questions separately from application of abuse of discretion
over pure legal errors, rather than as a reason to make it inapplicable, because a court

"would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of law or
on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Id. at 405. As noted above, some
courts are explicit that such legal error is not then discretionary; at the least, courts should
be clear, even in applying a more umbrella-like abuse test, that the legal error may be
identified and reviewed freely.

109. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
110. Id. at 99-100 (three citations to Cooter & Gell omitted).
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review, as opposed to saying review of legal questions is
subsumed by abuse of discretion review because proceeding on
legal error is necessarily an abuse, may be a distinction without
a difference. However, applying 'pure de novo review as a
function of the appellate court seems certain to have different
results than holding that the legal interpretation by the court
below is so egregiously erroneous as to constitute abuse.
Obviously, pure de novo review will be the more rigorous and
intrusive. If, in fact, that is one function of appellate courts, we
may be seeing an abdication of that function.11
In Cooter & Gell, then, what remained to be decided was
whether abuse of discretion review also should protect
determinations of legal conclusions, or whether instead de novo
review is the appropriate standard for the larger questions of
legal sufficiency. The Court used certain Underwood factors to
find that deference is appropriate on even the legal conclusion of
sufficiency in rule 11 proceedings."' In this context, the Court
asserts that the inquiry is not into "purely legal questions, such
as whether the attorney's legal argument was correct," but also
considers "issues rooted in factual determinations," including
credibility calls, plausibility, and reasonableness under the
11. This is not a development peculiar to civil and administrative matters. In Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), a habeas opinion (habeas is labeled a civil matter but is treated
in many ways like a criminal matter, as discussed in CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *,
ch. 13), Justice Thomas put forth a strong argument for very nearly absolute deference to
state courts in their interpretations of the United States Constitution. It has long been the
practice of federal habeas courts to review state court holdings on mixed fact-law questions
involving constitutional issues using a de novo review standard. Wright, 505 U.S. at 289.
Although Wright v. West did not overrule that practice, Justice Thomas' position on the
matter had three adherents and he used a large part of the opinion to put forth his reasoning
for applying deferential review to law holdings of state courts in habeas matters. Id. at 29193. The opinion is perhaps most memorable for Justice Thomas' misstatements of
precedential holdings, but it is part of an ongoing trend toward collapsing all standards into
simply "review" and making it all deferential. For comment on this trend, see CHILDRESS
& DAVIS, supra note *, chs. 1 & 7.
112. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 399 (citing Ninth and D.C. Circuit cases using some
de novo review).
113. See id. at 400-05. In fact, the Court stated the matter a bit broader by asking
whether deference is given the court's "legal conclusions," but it is apparent that this
refers to conclusions about the legal sufficiency of a filing, not the pure law underlying it,
which as noted above may constitute an abuse of discretion because informed by incorrect
law or improper factors. On the legal underpinnings, it is obvious the circuit court need not
defer, nor need it defer to "legal conclusions" if that means "statements of applicable
law."
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circumstances. By characterizing it as a "fact-dependent legal
standard," 11 the Court can justify a holding that the district court
is "better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the
pertinent facts and apply" this fact-dependent legal test"5 under
the "judicial position" factor.
Further, the Court faced the Underwood issue of
"substantial justification" roughly analogous to rule 11
sanctions; two of its factors-sound administration by superiorpositioned actors, and the difficulty of generalizing a clear legal
principle in such close calls-supported deference in this
context."6 The Court assumed, also, that the policy goals of rule
11 support deference through encouraging deterrence by
streamlined process even though it also found some
inconsistency in application "inevitable." "7 Thus the Court held
that, pursuant to those factors, abuse of discretion review,
subsuming fact and law determinations, is the proper test on all
rule 11 issues.
While confirming that Underwood's factors would become
a mode of inquiry in resolving initial questions into the
appropriate standard of review on procedural issues, Cooter &
Gell also reconfirmed that some first-glance guesses as to the
4

114. Id. at 402. Again, the Court might be criticized for downplaying an inquiry into the
nature of the issue, instead emphasizing policy analysis. One might expect a "legal
standard" to generally be judged by a de novo standard, even if the factual aspects or
underlying determinations receive deference. Yet Underwood "also concluded that [a]
district court's rulings on legal issues should be reviewed deferentially." id. at 403.
115. Id. at 402.
116. Id. at 403. The Court rejected, however, a distinction of Underwood based on the
mandatory language of rule 11: "that sanctions 'shall' be imposed when a violation is
found" has no "bearing on how to review the question" whether there was a violation. Id.
at 404. Perhaps it should; further, one could argue similarly that the presence of
discretionary language elsewhere in the rule's structure, see id. at 400 (in picking
appropriate sanction), argues in favor of de novo review over the mandatory provisions,
especially because the point of the rule 11 amendments is to make sanctions mandatory and
remove bad faith as the key inquiry. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.15.
117. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405. Fact-bound issues, the Court believed, cannot be
made consistent by de novo review. Accord Thomas v. Capital Security Serv., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Compare CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *,
§§ 2.13 and 2.28. Others have argued that rule 11 sanctions are unfairly inconsistent,
apparently assuming that one of the functions of appellate review is to establish guidelines
and some uniformity. See, e.g., CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.15; Sanford
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything At All?, 24 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 353 (1987). The Court may have downplayed uniformity as a policy goal; it also
seemed to ignore the Underwood factor of consequences and money amounts.
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applicability of abuse of discretion review-both cases involved
admittedly legal standards-will be deceiving under the Court's
current trend.
Extending abuse of discretion further as the generally
applicable test, however, makes it more likely that the term itself
will develop an even wider variety of meanings or at least many
more applications. "8 Even under a deferential general standard,
review of judgment requires judgment. The key, then, is focused
review, not excruciating labeling, and perhaps the Court's
seeming overgeneralizations in reality recognize this.
D. Koon v. United States
The Supreme Court has used the same inclusive discretion
standard to settle the issue of the proper standard of review for a
district court's decision to depart downward from the applicable
sentencing range, without distinguishing between the initial
decision that a departure is justified and the consequent decision
what that departure will be.
In Koon v. United States," 9 the police officers whose
treatment of Rodney King had been videotaped and entered in
evidence were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 242 with violating Mr.
King's constitutional rights under color of law and with willful
use of unreasonable force in arresting Mr. King. Two of the
officers were convicted of one or more counts. 2 The sentence
applicable to the convicted offenses for a person with criminal
history category I (no criminal history) was 70 to 87 months.
However, the district court chose to depart downward a total of
eight levels based on the victim's wrongful conduct of
provoking the crime, the likelihood that the defendants would be
targets of abuse in prison, that the defendants would suffer a
deprivation of employment and prospective employment, that
118. Professor Louis argued, before Cooter & Gell, that parts of rule 11 and other
review should be de novo in part because flexible review is needed. Louis, supra note 91,

at 757-61 (urging a less monolithic, more flexible approach, which in effect breaks down
particular issues and reviews them separately). He is correct, of course, that courts should
not avoid scope of review issues by resorting to labels instead of focused analysis. But his
proposal might be too complex and unrealistic in its own way by slicing sub-issues too

finely.
119. 518 US.81 (1995).
120. Id. at,88.
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the defendants were "significantly burdened" by successive
state and federal prosecutions, and that there was no danger of
recidivism. 2 ' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
departure decision de novo and reversed the downward
departure, largely on the grounds that the district court had
misinterpreted the departure instructions contained in the
Sentencing Guidelines.' 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the specific
purpose of determining "the standard of review governing
appeals from a district court's decision to depart from the
sentencing ranges in the Guidelines." 23
' The Guidelines allow
courts to depart from the applicable guideline ranges if "the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described,"'' 4 but taking into account only the Guidelines
themselves and the policy statements and commentary
accompanying the Guidelines. The Guidelines refer to the usual
sentencing ranges for typical cases as the "heartland," and then
instruct courts how to treat a case with facts that make it atypical
and that take it out of the "heartland.""'2 These atypical factors
are categorized as prohibited factors (factors that may never be
used for purposes of departing), encouraged factors (factors that
are often present but that cannot easily be taken into account
when formulating the general guidelines), and discouraged
factors (factors that are ordinarily not relevant in making a
departure decision and that126should be relied on only in very
exceptional circumstances).
The Court then stated:
If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing
court cannot use it as a basis for departure. If the special
factor is an encouraged factor, the court is authorized to
depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 92 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
Id. at 93.
Id.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

into account. If the special factor is a discouraged factor, or
an encouraged factor already taken into account by the
applicable Guideline, the court should depart only if the
factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other
way makes the case different from the ordinary case where
the factor is present. If a factor is unmentioned in the
Guidelines, the court must, after considering the "structure
and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the
Guidelines taken as a whole," . . . decide whether it is
sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's
heartland.127
All of these decisions, the Court held, should be reviewed
for abuse of discretion. This discretion arises both from the
traditional deference given to within-the-statutory-limits
sentencing by district judges, and by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, as
amended, which instructs courts of appeals to give "due
deference" to the decisions of the district courts in applying the
Guidelines to the facts. 2 Although the Court points out that the
level of deference due the district court's decision "depends on
the nature of the question presented," '129 nevertheless the
departure decision in most cases will be "due substantial
deference" not only because of the traditional deference
accorded the kind of first-hand familiarity with the case itself,
but also because the trial court has an "institutional advantage
over appellate courts in making those sorts of determinations,
especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than
appellate courts do"' 3 and thus can make the atypicality
assessment much more reliably than an appellate court. In
addition, these decisions are fact-driven decisions in which de
novo review would not serve its important function of giving

guidance for lower courts. 131

The Court recognized that some parts of the departure
exercise do constitute questions of law, but refused to separate
the kinds of issues and apply differing standards of review labels
to them.
127. Id. at 95-96.
128. Id. at 97.

129. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. So a mathematical error, for example, is owed no deference
at all and is reviewed de novo as a law question.
130. Id.
131. Id. at99.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The Government is quite correct that whether a factor is a
permissible basis for departure under any circumstances is
a question of law, and the court of appeals need not defer to
the district court's resolution of that point. Little turns,
however, on whether we label review of this particular
question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse-ofdiscretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is
beyond appellate correction. A district court by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. That a
departure decision, in an occasional case, may call for a
legal determination does not mean, as a consequence, that
parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other
parts are labeled an abuse of discretion. The abuse of
discretion standard includes review to determine that the
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions32

An example of the Court's own interpretation of the Koon
decision is shown by its GVR'33 of Meza v. United States.14 The

Seventh Circuit in that case had applied a separating analysis to
the departure decision of the trial court, holding that a
"defendant may... appeal a refusal to depart which rests upon
legal error," but that a "decision not to depart [from the
sentencing guidelines] is unreviewable on appeal if based on the
district court's discretion." 35
' The Court apparently felt that the
Meza analysis did not conform to Koon's more expansive view
of the boundaries of a lower court's discretion.'36
132. Id. at 100; see also Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal
Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v.
United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of
Deference" Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court
Depatures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
133. The notation "GVR," now familiar to many or perhaps most experienced appellate
practitioners, refers to the determination of the United States Supreme Court to grant the
petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the cause for further
consideration in light of a potentially controlling authority, especially a newly rendered
decision of the Court. The practice is discussed at length in Stutson v. United States, 516
U.S. 193 (1996) and Lawrence v. Chater,516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam).
134. 519 U.S. 990 (1996).
135. United States v. Meza, 76 F.3d 117, 120-21 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 519 U.S. 990
(1996), on remand, 127 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1139 (1998). Compare
United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1995) (court of appeals lacks
jurisdiction to review discretionary refusals to depart), with United States v. Burnett, 76
F.3d 376 (4th Cir.) (court of appeals has such jurisdiction but reviews with great
deference).
136. See also United States v. Crouse, 78 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (6th Cir. 1996) (same
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E. Calderon v. Thompson
But the Court does not consistently move toward the more
inclusive standard and the more deferential review. In an
opinion that seems to run counter to the general direction of the
foregoing cases, and in an odd twist on the concept of abuse of
discretion, the Supreme Court in Calderon v. Thompson 1 ' held
that the Ninth Circuit had committed a "grave abuse of
discretion"' 's by recalling its mandate denying habeas. The
court's mandate to correct error is usually considered "inherent
in the judicial power." 39
' Because this conduct is most often
considered solely a supervisory or administrative function, not
usually subject to development of legal rules, it should in the
normal course get highly deferential review as a discretionary
decision. However, the Calderon majority offers a number of
reasons why the discretionary decision at issue should be
reviewed by some other standard: (1) Recall was issued sua
sponte only two days before the defendant's scheduled
execution; (2) the defendant had filed two or more habeas
petitions (though the Ninth Circuit specifically set out that its
decision was on the merits of the first habeas petition and no
other, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)); (3) and, most importantly, as the Court
states, "Although the AEDPA does not govern this case,.., its
provisions 'certainly inform our consideration' of whether the
Court of Appeals abused its discretion."'4o
Justice Souter, in dissent, replies: "Why AEDPA is thought
to counsel review of recalls of mandates under anything but the
traditional abuse of discretion standard is unexplained by
anything in the majority opinion,"' 14' and argues further that
"[n]othing in AEDPA speaks to the courts of appeals' inherent
power to recall a mandate, as such, and so long as the power
over mandates is not abused to enable prisoners to litigate
otherwise forbidden 'second or successive' habeas petitions,...
analysis, also GVR'd at 519 U.S. 801 (1996).
137. 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
138. Id. at 542.
139. Id. at 567.
140. Id. at 558.
141. Id. at 572 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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AEDPA is not violated."1 41 In any event, the majority
determines to set a new standard of review for this specific kind
of decision: "[W]e hold the general rule to be that, where a
federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit
the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to
a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to
avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus
jurisprudence."1 43 In other words, the Supreme Court invented
an "abuse per se" test, so that issuing a recall in this particular
fact setting is no longer a discretionary call.
The result here is an unsurprising affirmation of the fact
that both the Court and Congress have the power to limit the
discretionary authority vested in the court or agency below, and
that at least a part of the standard for reviewing discretionary
decisionmaking is premised on the subject matter of the
decision. 44
III. ADVICE TO PRACTITIONERS
Because discretion and its exercise are often vague and
open ended, courts have some difficulty writing about discretion
and its review, and have set out slightly different tests with each
passing case. A common vice of appellate courts is treating the
various sorts and stages of discretionary decisionmaking under
the universal rubric of abuse of discretion, giving the appearance
that the courts believe they are dealing with one kind of issue.
Clearly there is no such thing as one abuse of discretion
standard. It is at most a useful generic term. Even within review
of discretionary calls (or perhaps because sometimes different
types of calls have a varying amount of real judgment to them),
this standard of review more accurately describes a range of
appellate responses. In practice, however, while courts cite
"the" abuse of discretion standard in varying contexts, most
imply awareness that varying kinds of review follow, whether
by firmly applying the factors applicable to the discretionary
142. Id.
143. Id. at 558.
144. The many wars over discretion in the administrative context, and its difference
from criminal and civil appeals, are compared in CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *
§§ 15.08 & 17.03.
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choice, 141or by giving a stronger presumption to one set of
applications,"' or even by blatantly stating
that several abuse of
147
discretion standards may be involved.
Most trial courts, however, do not explicitly clarify the
process of their decisionmaking when exercising discretion, so
that sometimes the reviewing court has difficulty deciding
whether the process of decision was a correct one. The lack of
clarity probably does not mislead most reviewing courts. They
understand that, once clearly stated, the factors and
considerations required to be used in the decision are legal (not
discretionary) factors and issues and thus are subject to
independent review on appeal. In such cases, abuse is still the
standard articulated, but it is simply found more readily where
the legal factors are dealt with improperly.
Nevertheless, courts and practitioners must bear in mind
that this shorthand sends an unclear message by including a
legal element within the abuse of discretion language, even
when the reviewing judges are rightly acting as if the decision is
necessarily an abuse of discretion because illegal means were
used to reach it. The formula does not clearly address what is
unacceptable for review of an exercise of discretion. On the
other hand, in some cases the only objection the appellate court
could have is to the ultimate choice made. Finding abuse in such
situations leads the reviewing court to describe more accurately
what has gone on below and what makes the decision itself
unacceptable, even though the process was proper and the
decision appears to be within the discretionary range.
While these methods of dealing with discretionary
decisions seem very different, in many cases it would be hard to
draw a line between them. Depending on the stage of
development of the particular exercise of discretion and its
potential to evolve into a legal rule, the reviewing court's focus
145. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982)
(factors to weigh when determining whether to close trials to public); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (mandating consideration of
twelve factors when determining attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
146. See, e.g., Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 586 (5th Cir. 1985)
(motion for new trial reviewed for abuse, but deference applied especially to denials). This
reality is discussed in CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.21.
147. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Ind. v. Piper, 480 F.2d 341, 389 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirmance no
matter which abuse test is used, indicating that there are many).
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may be unreliable. 4 1 On the one hand, the appellate court may
simply not yet be prepared to state that this overall choice is
unacceptable because as a legal matter the judge used improper
factors. Likewise, it may not be ready to say that the choice is
necessarily to be separated from its process. Thus the reviewing
court, when it has evolved a legal rule (e.g., is ready to declare
generically that no court may do what the judge below did),
should clearly acknowledge its function as a law-making
authority not bound by the factors and process of
decisionmaking below. Discretion is no longer actually involved
in the process, so it is no longer helpful to refer to that process
as reversible only upon an abuse of discretion.
While the decisionmaking is in the evolutionary process
from discretion to legal rule, reviewing courts often subdivide
the issue into its various components (facts, law, policy,
supervision) and apply the various standards as to independent
issues. However, the point of Supreme Court jurisprudence is
not that evolving decisions must be broken down into smaller
and smaller bits with each reviewed under the appropriate label.
Rather, as Justice Breyer said in First Options of Chicago v.
Kaplan,149 "It is undesirable to make the law more complicated
by proliferating review standards without good reason." 50 What
is needed instead of a separating analysis is a more careful
description of the exact question up for review. Counsel should
focus on the particular decision at hand and address whether
either the discretion label or the deference result is truly
appropriate. In turn, courts should address the decision on its
own terms without reflexive resort to the habitual catchphrase
148. See, e.g., Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (abuse found more
readily for class action denials than for continuances; "The courts have built a body of case
law with respect to class action status."); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 7.06. And,
of course, a court might not want to distinguish them if it has fully considered the intricate
relationship between law and discretion in the particular case. See, e.g., Post, supra note
11, at 210: "It is rather common for trial court decisions to be governed by legal standards,
even though the decisions are 'discretionary' from the point of view of an appellate court.
This is typical of the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Post would,
however, distinguish between deference, by which the reviewers defer to implementation
but retain control over its legal standard, and delegation, in which courts have power to
determine the governing rule, apparently viewing these as two forms of discretion. Id. at
215. Only rarely is discretion given without criteria for its exercise. Id. at 210-11.
149. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
150. Id. at 948.
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abuse of discretion unless it is found specifically applicable. 5 '
That is, almost every issue has underlying facts and most have
some area of law to apply. Clear error in factfinding or mistake
of law both can be subsumed under abuse of discretion review in
that a discretionary decision based on clearly erroneous facts or
on a mistake of applicable law is certainly an abuse of discretion
in itself. 5
As is apparent from the above, deciding when review
should in fact fall under an abuse of discretion standard (rather
than applying de novo review as a legal matter or clearly
erroneous review as to facts) can be as difficult as sorting
discretion from fact and law. For some time, abuse of discretion,
like other review standards, received little comment other than
the conclusory statements of courts, "This decision is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and no abuse is found."153
There seemed no way to argue with such a statement, but an
attempt at a minimum to define the decision in terms of the
intensity of review to be applied may refocus the attention of the
reviewing court from whether it agrees with the decision to the
exact nature of review that should be applied.
While the courts often may not state this reality,- 4 it is
implicit in the actual spectrum of responses they take under the
single abuse standard.' In the civil context, for instance, it
151. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.01 at 4-6.
152. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990).

153. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 396 (1959) (re
inspection (or not) of grand jury minutes), United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1117 (7th
Cir. 1999) (admission of rebuttal evidence); Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 149

(2d Cir. 1998) (value of attorney services).
154. Cf. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 1989)

(Flaum, J., concurring) (no single abuse of discretion standard exists, nor one de novo
standard, citing CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 4.1); American Int'l Underwriters,
Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1988) ("the abuse of discretion
standard in this [abstention] case should not be confused with the broader abuse of
discretion test used in other matters, such as rulings on certain evidentiary issues"); Christ-

Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 389 (2d Cir. 1973) (in comparing
"the" abuse test for grants versus denials of SEC injunctions, judge notes "scope of review
would appear to be different," but urges abuse to be found "whatever abuse of discretion
standard be applied"); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (despite

use of the same phrase, "in fact the scope of review will be directly related to the reason
why that category or type of decision is committed to the trial court's discretion in the first
instance").
155. For example, in CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 11.01, it is noted that in the
criminal appeal, deference traditionally has been so slight as to approach skepticism when
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cannot seriously be claimed that the same abuse of discretion
standard is used when a judge refuses to award attorney fees to a
prevailing civil rights plaintiff"6 as when she grants a one-day
continuance' or permits separate trials.1 8 Even a seemingly
single issue, such as the motion for new trial, may get different
deference under the abuse of discretion standard depending on
the basis for new trial argued, or whether it was granted or
denied.'59 Indeed, courts implicitly recognize the importance of
the factual context of the lower court's decision by saying more
often that the particular decision may not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion than saying that the decision is reviewed
under "the" abuse of discretion test.
It is not difficult to understand how the factual
circumstances of a case become linked to the standard of review
on appeal. The trial court often exercises its discretion after
considering the unique facts and factors presented by the case.
On appeal, the appellate court reviews the trial court's exercise
of discretion for abuse under the relevant considerations.Those
factors, then, become part of the individual issue on appeal and
thus part of the particular appellate application of an abuse of
discretion standard.' 6° Therefore, the abuse of discretion label is
often a variable that depends for its meaning on the context and

the judge goes to trial without the defendant, or nearly unreviewable when he imposes
sentence within statutory limits and under proper factors. See also id. § 4.21.
156. See id § 4.15.
157. See id. § 4.08. In setting a trial date, for example, a judge has been said to have the
power to act "as he pleases." Kaufman, Judicial Discretion, 17 AM. L. REV. 567, 567
(1883); see also Post, supra note 11, at 210; A. Wallace Tashima, Motion Practice in the
Central District, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1985, at 25 (district judge believes there is virtually
unlimited and unreviewable discretion in managing the docket). But see Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681 (1997), wherein Judge Wright's decision to delay the trial against President
Clinton until he had completed his term was held an abuse of discretion because, the circuit
court said, Judge Wright did not fully take into account Ms. Jones' right to have an
immediate trial. Id. at 707-08. It appears that most exercises of discretion are accompanied

by limiting factors or guidelines.
158. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 11.21.

159. See generally id. § 5.09.
160. See id. § 4.01 at 4-15; see also Durrett v. Housing Auth. of Providence, 896 F.2d
600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990) (where court's discretion is restrained in favor of a certain policy,
that policy is factored into abuse of discretion analysis; trial judge to exercise discretion by
what Judge Friendly called a "principle of preference"); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d
1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
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content of its application. The test becomes a sliding scale rather
than a single yardstick.
This does not mean that a situation in which discretion is
involved cannot be reviewed in a principled manner. Rather, it
means that the source of the review principle will be found not
in the bald abuse of discretion expression but in the particular
applications made for that and similarly postured issues. 61
'
Thus the successful practitioner must approach each issue
with sensitivity to the level of deference afforded the issue itself
62
and the factors the court must consider in making its choice.
Counsel should direct the appellate court's attention to the
judge's decision below with an eye toward exploring generally
what kind of discretionary decision was made there, in a way
that aids the reviewing court in understanding properly why, and
how much, deference should or should not follow. Appellate
courts, in turn, should frame their review by issue, factors,
reasoned analogy, and degree of discretion, providing general
guidance on the evolving concept of discretion as well as the
specific application at hand.6 6 At the very least, the court or
counsel should consider four questions:
1. Has this decision been given to the discretion of the
trial court? If so, why? That is, is there law to apply, a
framework of legal standards to contain possible
discretion, factors to guide the exercise of the
discretion, but nevertheless no actual rule of law, so
that the trial court is best positioned to exercise the
necessary discretion?
2. If the decision to be made has a framework of legal
standards or factors to guide the trial judge's exercise of
discretion, has the judge stayed within the framework
and properly considered the factors?
161. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, § 4.01 at 4-15.

162. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), wherein Judge Wright gave the
President a stay during his presidential term, and the Supreme Court, though
acknowledging that the court calendar is within the trial court's discretion, nevertheless
found the decision an abuse because the court did not give sufficient account of
respondent's interest in immediate trial. Id. at 707-08.
163. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note *, where several such applications are
discussed in sections 4.02-4.20, 5.08-5.09, 5.12-5.13, and 7.06. In addition, section 4.21
analyzes the broad meanings and deferences of abuse of discretion apart from its varying
contexts and factors.
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3. If this is a discretionary decision that is in the
evolutionary process, is there enough precedent to show
a pattern of decision and, if so, what is that pattern?
4. Has the appellate court indicated in this or analogous
issues that it is ready to state a rule of law based on that
pattern?
Answering these questions about the discretionary decision
at issue will help to formulate a way to address the issue itself.
IV. CONCLUSION

Counsel and scholars should look to the body of caselaw on
the issue involved to see what discretion means in that context.
Courts also may consider analyzing the Pierce v.
Underwood factors' 64 to decide whether abuse of discretion is
applicable, not only to determine applicability, but also to guide
application of the flexible abuse test. The strength or presence
of such factors-including judicial economy, position to judge,
use of evidentiary facts, and practicality of generating a
principle or rule-also may weigh heavily in a court's
considered decision as to the strength and scope of review within
the abuse of discretion standard.16

In the final analysis, the concept of discretion quite
naturally fights uniformity, so it should not be surprising that
review of discretion is not consistently applied or even6
theorized. Discretion is a pervasive yet evasive concept.
Nevertheless, "[t]o tame the concept requires no less than to say
why it is accorded or withheld, and to say so in a manner that
provides assurance for today's case and some guidance for
tomorrow's." "' Despite this direction, the courts have set out an
abuse of discretion inquiry broadly as the standard for reviewing
district courts' evidentiary, trial, and supervisory roles.

164. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 81-100.
165. Guidance from Underwood, statutes, precedent, and the nature of the issue may aid
the difficult application inquiry. Perhaps Underwood, then, is more about how much

deference than about the "whether deference" issue it decided.
166. See Post, supra note 11, at 169.
167. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 12, at 185.
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Review of discretionary decisionmaking has long been a

difficult area for appellate courts. These courts almost always
seek at least consistency and disinterestedness. But exercises of
discretion are so personal to the decisionmaker that even the
idea of second-guessing such a decision seems overly intrusive.
The appellate courts and the decisionmakers recognize that some
standards must be applied. Reviewing courts have thus selected
the label "abuse of discretion," which is used with flexible
intrusiveness of review tending to reflect the subject matter and
process of the decision.

